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5 How do people deal  with conflicts  between their beliefs  and observation?  This is  an
important question, both for theoretical and practical reasons. These kinds of questions
have received more attention in the field of Artifical Intelligence (e.g. Gärdenfors, 1988)
and philosophy (e.g. Harman, 1986), but have been relatively neglected in psychology.
However,  there have been recent studies that have looked at belief revision within a
larger framework of deductive reasoning (Elio and Pelletier, 1997, Politzer and Carles,
2001). These studies use the following basic paradigm. A reasoner is presented with a
conditional premise (If P then Q), which is described as being true. Then, P is presented as
being true, which induces the conclusion that “Q must be true”. However, following this,
it  is stated that “Q is false”.  How is this contradiction resolved? There are two main
strategies for doing so, the first involves revising belief in the conditional premise by
asserting that P does not necessarily lead to Q, the second involves putting into doubt the
minor premise that “P is true”. Initial studies indicate that, when faced with this kind of
contradiction, a majority of adults tend to revise the conditional premise (Elio, 1997, Elio
and Pelletier,  1997,  Dieussaert,  Schaeken,  De Neys and d’Ydewalle,  2000,  Politzer and
Carles, 2001, Revlin, Cate and Rouss, 2001) with both familiar and symbolic contents. Such
results seem to be explained by a recent theory (Legrenzi, Girotto and Johnson-Laird,
2003, Johnson-Laird, Girotto and Legrenzi, 2004). However, with conditional premises that
refer to familiar content, the tendency of revisions is modified by the extent to which
people believe that the conditional relation is true. Politzer and Carles (2001) found that
the tendency to revise the major premise increases when the premise is judged to be less
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certain. In other words, the tendency to abandon a hypothetical relation depends on the
level of belief spontaneously accorded to the relation. 
6 In these studies, the belief relation is presented to participants who are told to consider it
to be true. This does mirror some real-life situations in which relational beliefs of the
kind “If P is done, then Q will happen” are presented as being true by outside authority,
which may then be more or less supported by an individual’s own beliefs. However, in
many cases people will construct such beliefs on the basis of their personal experience.
One particularly salient example of this is the case of a researcher who arrives at a causal
hypothesis  after  conducting  a  series  of  experiments  that  provide  support  for  this
hypothesis. As we well know, there does not seem to be a strong tendency for researchers
to abandon their own hypotheses when faced with reported evidence contradicting this
belief. There do not appear to be any studies that have looked at this, but there are good
reasons to expect that self-construction of beliefs would produce more resistant beliefs, if
only because individuals should be more ready to trust to their own experience rather
than accepting another’s evaluation. 
7 The  basic  question  that  we  wish  to  examine  in  this  study  is  the  impact  of  self-
construction of a relational belief on belief revision. Our basic hypothesis is that self-
constructed beliefs  should be more resistant  to revision than beliefs  that  are simply
presented as true. Even if this hypothesis may appear obvious, it has not been tested to
our knowledge. We also examined another factor related to the effect of direct experience
with a relational belief.  We specifically looked at the relation between the amount of
experience that an individual requires in order to establish a relational belief and its
potential revision. We did not have a definite hypothesis here.  
8 In  order  to  look  at  this  hypothesis  in  a  relatively  controlled  environment  in  which
subjects could actively construct the conditional relation, we created a simple computer
system which presented 5 boxes in a row on the top of a screen, with 5 boxes below them
in one-to-one correspondence with the top boxes. The middle boxes in both the top and
bottom rows were clearly labeled as being of particular interest (the middle box on the
top row was labeled box A, and the middle box on the bottom row was labeled box B,
while none of the other boxes had any label at all). Using a mouse, participants could click
on any of the top boxes and one of the bottom boxes would turn red. In the case of boxes
2,  3,  4,  and  5  (from  the  left),  clicking  on  the  top  box  would  always  result  in  the
corresponding bottom box turning red (i.e. the bottom box 2 would always turn red when
the top box 2 is clicked, the bottom box 3 would always turn red when the top box 3 is
clicked, and so on). In order to provide some variability in the system, clicking on the first
top box resulted in systematic cycling between lower box 1 and lower box 3 turning red
(i.e. if lower box 1 turned red when the top box 1 was clicked, then the next time top box
1 was being clicked lower box 3 would turn red, and vice versa). For each participant, the
computer recorded the number of times that each box was clicked. A control condition
was used in which participants were simply told that it was always true that if box A was
clicked on, then box B would turn red (in this condition, subjects did not manipulate the
computer). Our main hypothesis was that the tendency to revise the if-then conditional
would be greatest in the control condition.
9 A total of 60 undergraduate students from the University of Quebec in Montreal(30 males,
30 females; average age = 28 years, 2 months) were randomly assigned to one of three
groups.
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10 A computer program was created using Microsoft Visual Basic. On the screen were two
rows of 5 grey boxes placed in one-to-one correspondence, with one row higher than the
other. The middle box in the top row was labeled box A, while the middle box in the
bottom row was labeled box B. None of the other boxes were labeled. A computer mouse
could be used to click on any of the top boxes, without restriction. Clicking on the first
box to the left of the top row initially resulted in the first box to the left of the bottom
row turning red. The next time this box was clicked on, the third box of the bottom row
turned red,  with  subsequent  tries  systematically  cycling  between the  first  and third
boxes. Clicking on any of the four remaining boxes on the top row always resulted in the
corresponding box on the bottom row running red.  Lower boxes would turn red for
approximately 1 second, after which the display reverted to original form (see Figure 1).
The  program  recorded  the  number  of  times  that  each  box  was  clicked  on  by  the
participants.
Figure 1 : Computer program used in the experiment : by clicking on top boxes 2, 3 (box A), 4 and 5
(from the left) corresponding bottom boxes turn red, and by clicking on the top box 1 (from the left),
bottom box 1 or 3 (box B) turn red.
11 All participants were interviewed individually. They were shown the computer screen
with the rows of boxes. In the control condition they were told that it was always the case
that if box A was clicked on, then box B would turn red, while in the two experimental
conditions, they had to test the computer program in order to discover by themselves the
relation  between  the  boxes  of  the  first  row  and  those  of  the  second  row.In  these
experimental conditions,participants were told to test the program until they felt certain
that  they  understood  how  it  worked  (in  particular,  the  one-to-one  correspondence
between A and B).  At  this  point,  the participants in the three groups were asked to
indicate what would happen if box A was clicked on and to rate the certainty of their
response. The first experimental group was given a certainty rating scale from 0 (“not at
all certain”) to 10 (“completely certain”), for this question. Results of this group showed
minimal variation in certainty levels. Thus, a second experimental group was asked how
much they would bet that if box A was clicked on, that box B would turn red. Participants
in  the  three  groups  were  then  told  that  a  third  (unknown)  person  using  the  same
computer program had clicked on box A on the previous day, but that this time the first
box to the left had turned red (this part corresponds to the introduction of a conflict
between their belief and their observation). They were then asked how they would
account for this by giving at least one explanation (involving a revision of their belief). 
12 Belief revision responses were of three types. The first type consisted of putting into
doubt the major (if-then) premises (i.e. by stating that clicking on box A did not always
make  box  B  turn  red).  The  second  type  consisted  of  putting  into  doubt  the  minor
premises (i.e. by stating that it was not true that someone had clicked on box A without
box B turning red) . A third response put into doubt both the major and minor premises.
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We first looked at the percentage of participants in each of the three conditions who were
ready to put into doubt the basic if-then conditional either by itself or in combination
with the minor premise. The percentage of participants who responded in this way was
40% for the first experimental group, 50% for the second experimental group and 80% for
the  control  group.  We  combined  the  two  experimental  groups  and  performed  a
Chisquared  analysis  in  order  to  compare  conditional  revisions  in  the  control  and
experimental groups.  This showed that there was a significantly larger percentage of
revisions of the conditional in the control condition, X2(1) = 6.65, p < .001. In fact, the
difference between the control group and both the first experimental group, X2(1) = 3.96,
p <  .05,  and the  second experimental  group,  X2(1) =  6.67,  p <  .001,  were  individually
significant. 
13 Our initial hypothesis was thus verified. We then looked at the relationship between the
number of times that participants in the experimental group tested each of the 5 boxes,
their degree of certainty that clicking on box A would turn box B red, and their tendency
to subsequently revise this conditional belief. 
14 We first looked at ratings of certainty on a 0 to 10 scale given by participants in the first
experimental group. Participants in this condition were instructed to test the mechanism
until  they were sure how it  worked,  thus we did not expect  much variation on this
dimension. In fact, 17 of 20 participants in this group gave a rating of 10, 1 gave a rating
of 9 and 2 gave a rating of 8. A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test showed that the mean rating
was not significantly different from 10. Although there was a positive correlation between
the number of tries of box A and certainty ratings, the low level of variation in certainty
ratings (coupled with further analyses that showed that the effects of certainty levels
disappeared when number of tries was partialed out) showed that certainty levels were
not useful indices of belief revision. In the second experimental group, participants were
asked to indicate how much they would bet that clicking on box A would make box B turn
red, in the hope that this might provide a more nuanced measure of certainty. However,
there were no significant correlations between bets and number of tries of box A or
between bets and belief revision. It is probable that variation in bets simply indicated
individual  differences  in risk  taking rather  than measurable  differences  in certainty.
Given this, we eliminated certainty ratings from the rest of the analysis. 
15 We then looked at the relationship between the number of times each of the 5 boxes were
tested and the tendency to revise the conditional belief. Table 1 gives the correlations
between number of trials on each of the 5 boxes and revision of the conditional belief. As
would be expected there are strong correlations among number of trials for each of the 5
boxes. There is also a significant correlation between trials of box A and belief revision
(-.36). That is, the more times participants tried box A, the weaker was the tendency to
reject the conditional subsequently.  However,  even more striking is the fact that the
correlation between trials of box 1 (the first box on the left and the only box for which
there was any variation in result)  and belief  revision is  also highly significant (-.51),
contrary to what was found with the remaining 3 boxes. 
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Table 1. Correlations between number of trials (clicks) of each of the five boxes and tendency to
revise the conditional.
16 Examination of the patterns of correlations among the 5 boxes does indicate that the
correlations between box 1 and the other four boxes are generally lower than those
among the latter. A principle components analysis of these correlations does indeed show
two factors. The first loads strongly onto the four boxes to the right of box 1. The second
loads strongly onto box 1,  with smaller contributions of  boxes 2,  and A.  This clearly
suggests that while there is a general effect of the number of tries of all the boxes, which
reflects the overall experience with the apparatus, there is something specific about how
box 1 is approached. We then looked at the way that trials on box A and box 1 were
specifically  related  to  belief  revision,  by  first  examining  partial  correlations.  The
correlation between trials on box 1 and belief revision, with trials on box A partialed out,
was -.39, while the correlation between trials on box A and belief revision, with box 1
partialed out was -.07. This clearly shows that investigation of box 1 contributes more to
the nature of belief revision than does investigation of box A, when their shared variance
is taken out. 
17 These results show that there are two factors that have an impact on belief revision in
this  situation.  The  first is  some  measure  of  overall  experience  with  the  conditional
relation which involves testing out both box A and box 1.  The second is the specific
contribution of testing out box 1 over and above this common level.  We can roughly
distinguish two models of how this latter factor might play out. One model is that the
absolute number of trials of box 1 determines the effect of belief revision, in which case
the  shared variance  would simply  reflect  the  fact  that  there  is  a  correlation among
numbers of trials for all the boxes, including box A. Another model is that box A trials do
contribute to belief revision, and that the relative proportion of box 1 trials to box A trials
also contributes to belief revision. We constructed a ratio score which consisted of box 1
trials divided by box A trials. We then performed two stepwise regressions on the belief
revision scores. In the first, we simply included trials on box A, box 1 and the ratio score,
and allowed the program to chose which variables were entered. Only trials on box 1 were
significant, and this accounted for 25.7% of the variance. In the second, we forced trials
on box A as the first factor. After this, only the ratio score was significant, and this alone
accounted for 27.0% of the variance. The second model consisting of trials on box A and
the  ratio  score  accounted  for  39.7%  of  the  variance,  much  higher  than  the  model
consisting of box 1 alone. This analysis supports the idea that it is not just the absolute
level of trials of box 1 that explains the effect of belief revision, rather it is the joint
contribution of trials on box A and the relative number of box 1 trials compared to the
number of box A trials that determines this effect. 
Belief Revision, Self-Construction and Systemic Certainty
Current psychology letters, 17, Vol. 3, 2005 | 2005
5
18 In  this  study,  we compared belief  revision in  two basic  situations  using a  computer
generated system that was completely unknown to the participants. The first involved
simply telling them that a given causal relation (“if box A is clicked then box B turns red”)
was true. In the second, participants were instructed to test the system until they were
certain of its functioning. The results of the first experimental group clearly show that
participants did just that, since they uniformly claimed to have a very high degree of
certainty that “if A then B” was true. 
19 The results of this manipulation clearly show that when people are faced with a conflict
between  a  conditional  belief  and  third-person  observation,  they  are  more  ready  to
abandon a belief that has been communicated by authority than one that has been self-
constructed from personal experience. While the situation employed in this study used an
artificial  environment,  the co-existence of a multitude of theories with disconfirming
evidence generated by researchers other than the originators of these theories in fields
such as psychology does support the idea that the results of this study can be reasonably
generalized to more ecologically valid contexts.
20 More interesting in many respects are results that show that belief revision is affected by
the  quantity  of  direct  experience  with  the  artificial  environment  used  here  in  two
different ways. Before looking at this, it is worth repeating that participants received
direct instructions to test this environment until they were satisfied that they understood
how it worked. In addition, the (“if A then B”) conditional relation that was used in the
belief revision task was always true, and thus generated no direct disconfirming evidence.
The results of the first experimental group clearly show that this generated very high
levels of subjective certainty that clicking on box A leads to box B turning red. Thus, the
clear effects of experience cannot be attributed to variation in subjective certainty. In
other  words,  we  can  fairly  conclude  that,  in  accordance  with  the  instructions,  the
participants in the experimental conditions ended their trials with a firm conviction that
“if box A is clicked then box B will turn red”. Nonetheless, despite these very high levels
of certainty, there are strong effects of quantity of evidence obtained by participants on
the tendency to conserve the relational belief when faced with a conflict between this
belief and third-party observation. 
21 How does direct  evidence affect  belief  revision? There is  first  an initial  effect  of  the
number of times that box A was directly tested. The more trials of box A that were used to
arrive at a high degree of certainty, the less tendency there was to subsequently reject
the  conditional  belief.  It  should  be  noted,  to  make this  point  even clearer,  that  the
correlation between trials of box A and belief revision among the 17 participants who
gave the maximal certainty rating (10) that the conditional belief was true, r(17) = -.47, p =
.06, was actually higher than that observed with the total experimental sample, r(40) =
-.36, p < .05, although the smaller number of participants makes the former correlation
only  marginally  significant.  Thus,  in  some  manner,  additional  experience  with  the
conditional relation makes this more resistant to subsequent modification in a way that
cannot be explained by subjective certainty about the truth of the relation. It is of course
possible that some other method of measuring subjective certainty might provide a link
between experience and belief revision, but our attempt using a betting paradigm failed
completely in doing so. 
22 The system that we presented to our participants also included one variable element.
Most strikingly, the strongest single predictor of whether the conditional relation (“if A
then B”) would be modified subsequently or not, is the number of times that this variable
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element was tested. Our analyses suggest that participants who examined box 1 (which
cycled systematically between the first and third places) relatively more often than they
examined box A tended to subsequently deny the conditional belief less often. 
23 Thus, in the particular universe defined by the simple computer system used here, belief
revision is determined by two factors, (1) direct experience with the conditional belief,
and (2) experience with the sources of variability in the system. Each of these contributes
separately  to  the  tendency  to  choose  to  revise  a  conditional  belief in  the  face  of
potentially disconfirming evidence, and appears to act in a way that is not captured by
explicit evaluations of certainty. 
24 This suggests that at some level certainty is a multi-layered construct, involving both an
evaluation of the consistency of a specific belief and an evaluation of the consistency of
the system in which the belief is embedded. In other words, the “epistemological status”
of a belief is determined not only by direct experience with the specific belief, but also by
some systemic certainty that provides a level of implicit certainty that can be stronger
than direct certainty of the belief in question. 
25 Preparation of this manuscript was supported by a grant from the Natural Sciences and
Engineering Research Council of Canada (CRSNG) to the second author.
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ABSTRACTS
The extent to which belief revision is affected by a process of self-construction of a conditional (if
P then Q) relation was examined using a computer generated system. Some participants were
told that it was always true that if P then Q, while others were allowed to explore the system in
order to self-construct this same relation to a high degree of certainty. Results show that the
tendency to modify a conditional belief was smaller when this belief was self-constructed than
when it was simply communicated. Interestingly, despite very high levels of subjective certainty
that accompanied self-construction, belief revision was strongly affected by (1) the quantity of
direct experience with the conditional relation, and (2) the quantity of direct experience with the
single variable element in the system. This suggests that certainty is a multi-leveled construct
that included an evaluation of the parameters of the system into which a belief is embedded.
L’influence des processus engagés dans l’élaboration personnelle d’une relation conditionnelle (si
P  alors  Q)  sur  la  révision  des  croyances  est  examinée  ici  au  moyen  d’un  système  d’auto
présentation segmentée implémenté sur ordinateur. A certains sujets, il était dit que la relation si
P alors Q était toujours vraie ; aux autres, il leur était proposé d’explorer le système afin qu’ils
établissent  par  eux-mêmes  cette  même  relation,  avec  un  degré  de  certitude  très  élevé.  Les
résultats montrent que les sujets révisent plus leur croyance en la relation conditionnelle lorsque
cette croyance leur est imposée que lorsqu’ils ont à l’élaborer. Et malgré le fait que l’on observe
un degré très élevé de certitude de la croyance issue de cette élaboration, la révision de cette
croyance paraît  très nettement dépendre (1)  du nombre de fois qu’a été explorée la relation
conditionnelle, et (2) du nombre de fois qu’a été exploré l’unique élément qui variait dans le
système. Ces résultats suggèrent que la certitude est une construction à plusieurs niveaux qui
implique une évaluation des paramètres du système dans lequel une croyance est issue.
INDEX
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